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.The natural tendency of their just indignation against so vile a criminal isindeed the most fatal and ruinous to him.But it is impossible that we should bedispleased with the tendency of a sentiment, which, when we bring the case hometo ourselves, we feel that we cannot avoid adopting.II.i.3 64 The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam SmithChap.IVRecapitulation of the foregoing chapters1.We do not, therefore, thoroughly and heartily sympathize with the gratitude1of one man towards another, merely because this other has been the cause of hisgood fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we entirelygo along with.Our heart must adopt the principles of the agent, and go along withall the affections which influenced his conduct, before it can entirely sympathizewith, and beat time to, the gratitude of the person who has been benefited by hisactions.If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety,how beneficial soever its effects, it does not seem to demand, or necessarily torequire, any proportionable recompense.But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of2the affection from which it proceeds, when we entirely sympathize and go alongwith the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his ownaccount, enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those whoowe their prosperity to his good conduct.His actions seem then to demand, and, ifI may say so, to call aloud for a proportionable recompense.We then entirely enterinto that gratitude which prompts to bestow it.The benefactor seems then to be theproper object of reward, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and approve of,that sentiment which prompts to reward him.When we approve of, and go alongwith, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approveof the action, and regard the person towards whom it is directed, as its proper andsuitable object.2.In the same manner, we cannot at all sympathize with the resentment of one3man against another, merely because this other has been the cause of his mis-fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we cannot enterinto.Before we can adopt the resentment of the sufferer, we must disapproveof the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all sympathy withthe affections which influenced his conduct.If there appears to have been no im-propriety in these, how fatal soever the tendency of the action which proceedsfrom them to those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve anypunishment, or to be the proper object of any resentment.But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the impropriety of the affec-4tion from whence it proceeds, when our heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives of the agent, we then heartily and entirely sympathizewith the resentment of the sufferer.Such actions seem then to deserve, and, if III.i.4 65 The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smithmay say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable punishment; and we entirely enterinto, and thereby approve of, that resentment which prompts to inflict it.The of-fender necessarily seems then to be the proper object of punishment, when we thusentirely sympathize with, and thereby approve of, that sentiment which promptsto punish.In this case too, when we approve, and go along with, the affectionfrom which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, andregard the person against whom it is directed, as its proper and suitable object.Chap.VThe analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit1.As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arises from what I shall1call a direct sympathy with the affections and motives of the person who acts, soour sense of its merit arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy with thegratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon
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