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.S.governments seek friendly, cooperative relations with40 other governments.Such normal ties involve allocating various resources to epilogue 3071 them.Given the shortcoming in domestic support, these transfers tend to2 be interpreted as helping to determine the client s government, interven-3 ing in its otherwise internal affairs.Hence, some forms of clientelism seem4 inevitable when they partly result from the projection of power or influence5 in an unstable, nonconsensual regime environment.In fact, as discussed, a6 tendency of client-state politics is for local factions to look for international7 alliances, collecting support from foreigners in their pursuit of their own8 partisan interests to form or sustain a government.In polarized clientelistic9 settings strong interventionist demands are unleashed against the neutrality10 of key international actors.In Latin America, not only did the United States11 intervene, but so did some of its friends and foes as well.12 Practically from their beginning, U.S.-Latin America relations were con-[307], (11)13 ditioned by the related problems of institutionalizing democracy and the14 propensity to experience regime overthrow in Latin America.With a mea-15 sure of independence from Latin American realities, the different interventionLines: 15516 objectives of American governments were rationalized under two ideal-type 17 banners, democratic crusades and realpolitik.Domestic and foreign realities0.0pt Pg18 rendered untenable the search for an absolute, universal or permanent doc- 19 trine of American international policy.Normal Pa20 It is intriguing that since early in the nineteenth century pro-democraticPgEnds: TE21 interventionist rationalizations were recurrently used.As we saw, during the22 period of maximum U.S.military intervention in Central America that ended23 in the 1930s, the economics of Big Stick diplomacy was partially masked[307], (11)24 by democratic international treaties.Despite its democratic conceptual links,25 Theodore Roosevelt s corollary to Monroe, with its unilateral U.S.physical26 interventions, was highly feared and resented in Latin America.The corol-27 lary s goals were overshadowed by the perceived arrogant, paternalistic, go-it-28 alone attitude of the United States, and its bellicose claim to the right to use29 preemptive force in defense of the national interest in Latin America s sup-30 posedly independent nations.The principles of non-intervention and national31 sovereignty guide wise, prudent rules.Economic clientelism proper is the least32 justified form of intervention.In my view it should be considered an absolute33 prohibition.2234 The unilateral deployment of U.S.troops was not sufficient to exercise35 U.S.regional leadership and obtain politically supportive, friendly ties in the36 Americas.To achieve these goals a Pan American movement was developed37 with inter-American conferences, in which the region s sovereign states partic-38 ipated under the cloud of long, recurrent U.S.interventions in a few countries.39 The result of this diplomacy was incorporated into FDR s Good Neighbor pol-40 icy and culminated in the formation of the Organization of American States. 308 epilogue1 By treaty, Monroe was multilateralized, and the principle of non-intervention2 by American countries in each other s affairs was established, as were the prin-3 ciples of collective defense of the Americas.By the Truman years the United4 States had exchanged the expediency of unilateralism for the principle of5 non-intervention protective of weaker parties and for a system of multilateral6 collective defense against both inter and extra Western Hemisphere foreign7 interventions.8 The constitution of the oas and U.S.participation in it serves to test9 multilateralism.In the past a spirit of non-intervention to forcefully change10 regimes fairly consistently prevailed in the body.This reflected a relatively11 broad, though not universal, view of political values, interest, and respon-12 sibility in Latin America.Yet the organization performed useful consultative[308], (113 functions and policies.It contributed to foster measures of regional solidarity14 and successfully mediated various conflicts.15 Faced with the realities of non-intervention sentiment within the oas andLines: 1616 the need for action felt by some U.S.administrations, the United States did 17 not choose to withdraw from the body nor to formally repudiate multilateral-0.0pt18 ism ideologically as the preferred option; this was deemed too undiplomatic, 19 counterproductive, and unnecessary.Normal20 Indeed, in the most serious Latin American crisis that faced the UnitedPgEnds:21 States in the previous century, the oas provided legitimacy to American re-22 solve.In the 1962 prelude to the Cuban Missile Crisis the organization sup-23 ported the member states to take those steps that they consider appropriate[308], (124 for their individual or collective self-defense, and.to counteract threats or25 acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security resulting26 from the.intervention in this Hemisphere of the [Communist] powers. 27 Alternatively, when considered necessary by Washington to the nation s28 security, the U.S.government occasionally circumvented the oas, even unilat-29 erally deploying American troops.Noteworthy was the pioneering case of the30 Dominican Republic in 1965.Faced with a de facto U.S.invasion, the oas ac-31 cepted the fact, and a transitory force from six Latin American countries (plus32 the United States) temporarily occupied Santo Domingo, until the formation33 the following year of a new Dominican government.The oas facilitated the34 handling of the conflict and the early withdrawal of U.S.troops and consoli-35 dation of a new regime.In sum, while the oas did not impede the occasional36 but brief U.S.physical interventions, it served to restrain the arbitrary use of37 force.Its existence helped to avoid American unilateral and long occupations38 of countries.The principle of non-intervention did not prove to be an absolute39 prohibition, but it served functions, such as tempering the fanciful changes in40 foreign policy fads of U.S.and Latin governing circles. epilogue 3091 In January 2001 George W.Bush became president.Candidate Bush had2 projected radical departures from his predecessors: a conservative realpoli-3 tik nationalism, inclined to isolationism and unilateralism in world affairs.4 An arrogant leitmotif, that the inordinate superpower status of the United5 States allowed it to act alone you don t like it, that s too bad attitude was6 manifest.23 In Bush s new realism, the national interest, not humanitar-7 ian nation-building involvement nor the moral interests of the international8 community, would be the paramount standard.The climate of greater isola-9 tionism was evident in the professed lesser inclination to intervene in other10 countries and participate in pro-democratic campaigns and in an aversion to11 binding international treaties.A new international division of labor to reflect12 America s power would be pursued.No U.S
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