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.43 Sometime aroundFebruary 1993, with preparations well under way for enforce-ment of the ban on military flights over Bosnia, Francedemanded that the operation be directed by a non-BritishEuropean.44 Plans to run air operations from Aviano Air Base62 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIAin Italy a base long used by the Americans were scuttled,because planners felt that using Aviano would tend to cutAmerica s allies out of the operation.45 In the end, NATO s 5thAllied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF) Headquarters at Vicenza wasselected as the site from which to direct the no-fly zoneenforcement, and its commander, Lt Gen Antonio Rossetti ofItaly, was to head the operation.46 Because Rossetti worked forGeneral Ashy, the NATO chain of command in the southernregion ran from Admiral Boorda, to General Ashy, to GeneralRossetti, to General Chambers, who quickly began directingthe day-to-day operations from Vicenza s combined air opera-tions center (CAOC).47 This arrangement increased GeneralAshy s role in controlling the air operations over Bosnia; how-ever, the command relations were a bit muddled, becauseGeneral Chambers retained both his title as a US JFACC andcommander of the non-NATO, US air operations in the region,such as the Provide Promise humanitarian airdrops.48The way NATO commanders in the southern region dealtwith helicopters violating the no-fly zone illustrated the influ-ence of these theater-level commanders on the use of air-power.In order to maintain tight control over Operation DenyFlight, NATO authorities decided that orders to shoot downaircraft caught violating the no-fly zone could not be made byanyone below the CAOC director, General Chambers.49 Theno-fly zone resolution banned unauthorized flights by helicop-ters, as well as by fixed-wing aircraft.50 Initially NATO hadsome success at curtailing helicopter flights.By interceptingthe helicopters and making warning passes, NATO pilots gotmany of the helicopters to land during the first weeks of DenyFlight.51 But, as General Chambers later recalled, it onlyworked for about the first 100 intercepts, after which theunauthorized helicopters began to heed NATO s warnings lessand less, eventually flouting the no-fly zone openly.52 Thoughno one below Chambers knew it at the time, he and his supe-riors, Ashy and Boorda, were not going to authorize the down-ing of helicopters over Bosnia.53 However the mounting num-ber of violations by helicopters soon drew criticism fromabove.54 In defending the decision, Chambers later explainedthat if NATO did shoot down a helicopter (1) it would turn out63 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDto be the wrong helicopter; (2) it would be the right helicopter,but it would fall on the wrong spot, perhaps killing innocentpeople on the ground; or (3) failing (1) or (2) the downing of ahelicopter would not have an appreciable effect on the militaryoperations of the faction using the helicopter and all sideswere conducting unauthorized helicopter flights.55 InChambers s view, despite some high-level discontent with thehelicopter violations, no one wanted to take the responsibilityfor overriding the commanders in the field by ordering thathelicopters be shot down.56 Safe Areas and Lift and Strike On Wednesday, 20 January 1993, Bill Clinton was inaugu-rated as the 42d president of the United States, and hisNational Security Council soon took up the issue of militaryintervention in Bosnia.Gen Colin Powell, in describing hisadvice to the council about using airpower in Bosnia, claimedI laid out the same military options that I had presented to PresidentBush.Our choices ranged from limited air strikes around Sarajevo toheavy bombing of the Serbs throughout the theater.I emphasized thatnone of these actions was guaranteed to change Serb behavior.Onlytroops on the ground could do that.Heavy bombing might persuadethem to give in, but would not compel them to quit.And, faced withlimited air strikes, the Serbs would have little difficulty hiding tanksand artillery in the woods and fog of Bosnia or keeping them close tocivilian populations.Furthermore, no matter what we did, it would beeasy for the Serbs to respond by seizing UN humanitarian personnelas hostages
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