[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.The United States advocated free competition for airlines, with theICAO s remit limited to technical matters.Great Britain wished forthe ICAO to be concerned with regulation, so that it could allocateroutes, fix rates, and regulate the frequency of flights.In a compro-mise, the ICAO was to maintain order in the air and technical stan-dardization.Its economic role was limited, but it was empowered toavoid waste through excessive competition.The convention affirmedstates sovereign rights over the airspace over their territory, thoughleaving unclear how high into the stratosphere this extended.Sched- CHINA " 55uled flights can only be made through this airspace with permission.Subsidiary agreements, the International Air Services Transit Agree-ment, and the International Air Transport Agreement (Five Freedomsagreement), which were not accepted by all parties, established rightsof transit and emergency landing, and freedom to carry goods andpassengers between countries that were not the aircraft s homeland.The ICAO, based in Montreal, Canada, became a specialized agencyof the United Nations in October 1947.CHINA INCIDENT.See SINO JAPANESE WAR.CHINA.From the start of the 20th century until 1931, U.S.policy to-ward China was defined by the open door principles of free accessfor American commerce and opposition to the development of exclu-sive spheres of influence by other powers.Chinese immigration tothe United States had been halted in 1882, but Americans had devel-oped a sentimentalized attachment to China itself.It was seen as anarea of opportunity for Christian missionary work and for the expan-sion of markets for American manufacturers.China was believed tohave the potential to become a democratic republic along Americanlines.U.S.activities in China, as in other parts of Asia, largely tookthe form of government-encouraged private loans and initiatives, inaddition to missionary activities.The United States found itself increasingly opposed to Japan sambitions in China and attempted to circumscribe them in the FivePower Treaty agreed on at the 1921 Naval Disarmament Confer-ence in Washington, D.C.However, there was no desire to getembroiled officially in Chinese affairs, though events like the 1927Nanking Incident had that effect.A trade treaty in 1928 gave Chinamost favored nation status with regard to tariffs.By 1930, 500 U.S.companies were investing $155 million in China, though this wasonly 1 percent of total U.S.foreign investments, and trade with Japanwas double that with China.When Japan occupied Manchuria in the 1931 32 ManchurianCrisis, the U.S.response was passive disapproval, enunciated in theStimson Doctrine.American popular attitudes toward China weresympathetic, encouraged by the writings of Pearl S.Buck, but senti-ments of pacifism and isolationism meant there was little support 56 " CHINAfor active intervention.This attitude prevailed with the outbreak ofthe Sino Japanese War in July 1937 and the USS Panay incidentin December.Shanghai fell to Japan in November after devastatingbombing of civilians.The capital, Nanking (Nanjing), fell in De-cember 1937, followed by extensive massacres and rapes.PresidentFranklin D.Roosevelt had delivered his quarantine speech inOctober but made no concrete proposals.At the November BrusselsConference, U.S.delegates did not press for blockades or embargoesof Japan.This changed in 1940 with a shift in State Department policy as-sociated with Stanley K.Hornbeck.Japan s expansionism was to becontested.Publisher Henry Luce and others stepped up pro-ChiangKai-shek reporting.Chiang, who had become a Christian in 1930,was widely regarded in the United States as a democratic Chinesenationalist and modernizer, and U.S.flyers joined the AmericanVolunteer Group to come to his aid.China was named as a firstrecipient of Lend-Lease along with Great Britain.Congress voted a$500,000 loan in February 1942.The State Department wanted to gofurther and build American strategy around extensive aid to Chiangand military operations in China.Roosevelt was keen for China to beregarded as the fourth great power alongside the United States, GreatBritain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) andhad hopes that China could spearhead the process of decolonizationof the European empires in Asia.However, he was cautious aboutbuilding military strategy around China.General Joseph Stilwellwas sent to assist the Chinese struggle, but few U.S.troops weredeployed there, and China was low on the list of priorities for sup-plies.This was partly because the route to China was a difficult one,involving flights over the Himalayas.Roosevelt played up supportfor China domestically, and U.S.domestic opinion continued to bevery enthusiastic about Chiang, and his wife, Soong Mei-ling, be-came a national celebrity in her own right, boosted by the Luce press.Roosevelt met Chiang at the 1943 Cairo Conference and painted arosy picture to him of China s future role.Roosevelt promised in theCairo Declaration that China would receive back all territory lost toJapan since 1894
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]